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Abstract 
After contextualizing the rise of oil as a factor in Great Power 
geo-strategy in the late 19th and early 20th century, the paper 
at hand zooms in on the shift from passivity to 
interventionism in American policy towards Saudi Arabia as 
an effect of the increased importance of petroleum. It is 
shown how immediate resource depletion worries and more 
long-term strategic concerns prompted an increasing 
American involvement in Saudi Arabia, the effects of which 
are felt until today.  
We take a holistic view on the complex entanglement of 
political and economic, state and private interests. The shift 
of momentum from primarily private initiative to state 
initiative during and after WWII is emphasized. It is shown 
that until WWII a good case could be made in favor of a high 
degree of political passivity – not out of genuine strategic 
disinterest for Saudi Arabia, but to leave the stage to 
diplomatically less conspicuous private actors as long as 
possible. 
A review of the scramble-for-oil era can potentially yield 
useful historical insights, e.g. for the analysis of the 
international dynamic which fresh water is gaining as a 
scarce resource. The evolution of America’s relationship with 
Saudi Arabia is a classical example of strategic entry to gain 
control of a vital resource. It can provide an historical case 
for the approach of phasing into a market with private activity 







































“Control energy and you control the nations”1 Henry 
Kissinger once said. What has increasingly become a 
commonplace nowadays has not always been the obvious 
source of economic and political power. In the later 19th and 
early 20th century the factor coal has only sluggishly been 
challenged by the factor oil as the prime source of energy, 
especially in land-based and naval, and later airborne auto-
motion. This extensive prologue wants to provide some 
context about the rise of the factor oil in general and the 
important role of oil in the “pre-diplomatic” era of Saudi-
American relations in particular in order to make the actual 
core part of this work more readable, and to make it easier 
to fathom its holdings with a comprehensive understanding. 
It wants to be understood as a prologue in the actual 
meaning of the word. It precedes the actual focused part that 
is footed on primary research. It shall merely serve to 
facilitate and contextualize the reading of the core essay. 
 After WWI, Delaisi2 could rightfully claim: “The 
victory of the Allies over Germany was (…) in some ways 
the victory of the truck over the locomotive” – or in other 
words: The victory of petroleum over coal. But until this 
epically-proportioned illustration of the fundamental shift in 
the rules of the imperial energy game, visionaries like John 
Arbuthnot Fisher - who championed a transition of the Royal 
Navy from coal to petroleum for its qualitative superiority as 
early as 18823 - fell on deaf ears in the higher political 
strata. Coal was plenty and domestically available, whereas 
none of the nations later called the Western Powers except 
for the United States of America disposed of domestic crude 
oil reserves.  
 But Fisher argued that only by converting to oil 
would the British fleet be able to retain its superiority.4 For 
instance, a coal-based steamer was visible up to ten 
kilometers away due to its tell-tale smoke; a diesel engine 
based on petroleum did not emit nearly as much smoke. A 
traditional coal-based steamer needed up to nine hours for 
its engine to reach peak-power, whereas a diesel engine 
could reach full power within 5 minutes after 30 minutes of 
starting up. To fuel up diesel engines, it merely required the 
work of 12 people for twelve hours, while the same energy 
                     
1 Engdahl 2004, XI 
2 Delaisi 1922, 29; as cited in Yergin 1993, 171 
3 Engdahl 2004, 19; Yergin 1993, 167 





   







































stored in coal took 500 men five days to get aboard. Lastly 
and most importantly, Diesel engines weighed one third of 
their equivalent and had a radius four times that of coal-
engines. Given all this, it was a matter of time for coal to be 
ousted in the military and then broader society for auto-
motive propulsion. The actual transition in the Royal Navy 
would later be overseen by young W. Churchill during the 
naval race with Wilhelmine Germany5.  
 For the conduct of international relations, the rise 
of the factor oil effectively prompted an integration of the 
practical, everyday-strategic focal region of geopolitics with 
the long-term pivot of history as suggested by J. H. 
Mackinder6 in the Middle East, where the vastest reserves of 
crude oil are to be found. To the degree that oil became 
more important – or even only prospectively more important 
– the European Great Powers adopted its supply into their 
political agendas. Access to it evolved to be an immediate 
necessity for military prowess and a more long-term 
necessity for economic prowess. Upon the triumph of 
petroleum propulsion in the industrial countries’ navies and 
of the internal combustion engine, invented by G. Daimler in 
1885, securing stable access to oil became a strategic sine-
qua-non. Against the backdrop of this, the British, French, 
and German activity in the Middle East around and after the 
turn of the century is explicable, and from a realist point of 
view perfectly sensible.  
 The United States did not face a strategic dilemma 
comparable to that of the latter three. America had, despite 
British activity in Persia, provided as much as 80% of the 
allied oil supply during WWI through Standard Oil of New 
Jersey (later Exxon)7. The answer to the question, why 
America apparently pushed for the solution of a strategic 
problem that it did not have during and in the aftermath of 
WWI lies in long-term concerns: The American society’s 
intelligentsia was shaken by a (not the last…) depletion 
panic. Among other escalators, a statement by the director 
of the US Geological Survey, who called the situation 
“precarious”, contributed to the fear of running out of 
domestic oil8.  It became increasingly consensual that 
America should seek overseas deposits of the valuable 
commodity. 
 But after WWI, Britain’s strategic position in the 
scramble for Middle Eastern oil was virtually impeccable: 
                     
5 Bronson 2006, 15; Yergin 1993, 150-167 
6 Mackinder 1904 
7 Bronson 2006, 15 






































Relying on the mandate-system and the Turkish/Iraq 
Petroleum Company (besides of course AIOC/APOC)9 10, 
Britain nearly held a monopoly. Standard Oil New Jersey 
and Socony-Vacuum (later Mobil) entered into negotiations 
with the IPC11 in 1928. They were diplomatically backed by 
the American Department of State, where the exclusionary 
behavior of a recent war-ally was perceived as outrageous. 
The American companies ultimately gained a 23.75% share 
in IPC each12 and the State rolled back to the role of an 
interested spectator.  
 The companies’ negotiations culminated in the Red 
Line Agreement. The US-companies gained access to 
essentially the entire Middle East; the territories were circled 
by a red line – however, they also bound themselves to 
consensual IPC-decision-making and the abnegation from 
individual drillings or deals within the encompassed area. 
This policy was in its root a shrewd monopolist move to keep 
supply rare and therewith prices up13. When joining IPC and 
the Agreement, for instance the US Gulf Oil Company 
actually had to sell a concession it held in Bahrain14.  
 Standard Oil of California, Socal, was not a 
signatory of the Red Line Agreement. They bought the 
Bahrain-concession from Gulf Oil for $50,000 and struck oil 
there in 193215. When a Socal scientist observed that close-
by Saudi Arabia’s geological structure was practically 
identical to that of offshore Bahrain, Ibn Saud’s desert 
Kingdom entered the international focus. While IPC and its 
British, French, and American owners lobbied Ibn Saud for 
his concession to keep Socal out and any further drillings 
from happening, Socal actually meant business. Besides a 
pro-Socal bias of the translating Harry St. John Philby (a 
bias incidentally fixed in a secret contract)16, this prospect of 
substantial future yields in royalty payments inclined Ibn 
Saud to opt for Socal, along with the American white 
diplomatic vest (no evident imperial-colonial ambitions). 
                     
9 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company/Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
10 Mejcher 1980 
11 Iraq Petroleum Company 
12 Bronson 2006, 15-17; Engdahl 2004, 74-75; Yergin 1993, 283; “New Oil 
Leases Granted In Arabia.” New York Times (1857 - Current File), Aug 
1, 1936, ProQuest Historical Newspapers. The New York Times (1851-
2005), 24. Consulted at the RSC Middelburg 
13 Galvani 1974, 5; Loftus 1948, 21; Maugeri 2006, 29; Yergin 1993, 203-
206 
14 Bronson 2006, 16; Yergin 1993, 282, 291 
15 “New Oil Leases Granted In Arabia.” New York Times (1857 - Current 
File), Aug 1, 1936, ProQuest Historical Newspapers. The New York 
Times (1851-2005), 24. Consulted at the RSC Middelburg 





   







































Washington had given diplomatic recognition to Ibn Saud’s 
Kingdom in May 193117. The California Arabian Standard Oil 
Company, Casoc, (renamed Arabian-American Oil 
Company, Aramco, in 1944)18, was formed and partly sold to 
Texas Oil in 1936 in order to gain access to the latter’s 
markets19.   
 In 1938 Casoc found oil in Dammam, close to 
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. At a time when average American 
wells produced 100 barrels/day and Bahrain totaled 13,000 
barrels/day, the new Arabian discovery produced more than 
1500 barrels/day alone20. One year later, the first tanker left 
from Saudi Arabia21. In 1939, Ibn Saud extended his 
concession to cover more than half of his territory22 as 
provided by a secret 1933 amendment to the original 
concession23. 
II. Introduction  
Despite these developments, the crème of American politics 
took comparably little interest in Saudi Arabian affairs before 
the midst of WWII. 
 This essay does not approach the relations 
between the two countries in a strictly statist way in favor of 
taking a more holistic view:  Especially in the period before 
                     
17 “Secretary of State Stimson to Ambassador Dawes.” United States 
Department of State. Volume II (1931). Papers relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1931, 551-552. University of Wisconsin 
Digital Collection. <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-
idx?type=browse&scope=FRUS.FRUS1> 
18 Bronson 2006, 18 
19 Bronson 2006, 16-18; Yergin 1993, 282-284, 289-292; Levy, Joseph M. 
“U.S. Company Wins Arabian Oil Grant.” New York Times (1857- 
Current file), Aug 8, 1939. Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES. 
Proquest Historical Newspapers. The New York Times (1851-2005), 1. 
Consulted at the RSC Middelburg 
20 Brown 1999, 71-75, as cited in Bronson 2006, 19; Yergin 1993, 299 
21 Yergin 1993, 301; “Arabia Oil Field To Open.” New York Times (1857 - 
Current File), March 10, 1939. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. The 
New York Times (1851-2005), 9. Consulted at the RSC Middelburg 
22 Bronson 2006, 19; Levy, Joseph M. “U.S. Company Wins Arabian Oil 
Grant.” New York Times (1857- Current file), Aug 8, 1939. Wireless to 
THE NEW YORK TIMES. Proquest Historical Newspapers. The New 
York Times (1851-2005), 1. Consulted at the RSC Middelburg; 
      “Oil Company Tells Of Arabian Deal.” New York Times (1857 - Current 
File), Aug 9, 1939. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. The New York 
Times (1851-2005). 28. Consulted at the RSC Middelburg; 
      “Handwriting in Oil.” New York Times (1857- Current file), Aug 9, 1939, 
Proquest Historical Newspapers. The  New York Times (1851-2005), 13. 
Consulted at the RSC Middelburg 






































WWII, Saudi-American relations are by and large relations 
not between two states, but between a financially strong 
non-state actor and a financially weak state. It is only in the 
course of WWII that the American state becomes more 
prominent in Saudi-American relations. And even after its 
becoming active, the nature of these relations evolves to that 
of a complex, intricate triangle between Washington, Riyadh, 
and Aramco’s (respectively in effect Socal’s and Texaco’s) 
headquarters much rather than to straight bilateral 
diplomacy as would be consistent with classical political 
realism. 
  It is the ambition of this paper to trace back the 
shift of behavior in American high-level politics towards 
Saudi Arabia during WWII. Relying largely on the 
presidential records of the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
administration, the text at hand will outline and gauge the 
development from apathy to interventionism and how it 
came about. Along the way, special attention will be paid to 
the question whether the low profile that the American state 
kept for so long can be imputed to genuine neglect of the 
matter or whether there have been conscious strategic 
considerations indicating the advisability of “sitting on the 
fence”. The central purpose of this paper however is and 
remains to be a representation of the shift of policy towards 
Saudi Arabia. It will be shown that it was the result of 
essentially two developments – growing depletion fears on 
one hand, and growing awareness of the extent of Saudi 
crude oil deposits on the other – catalyzed by the 
atmosphere of the first truly global war (WWII), which made 
the interaction of the said two components possible to the 
effect that America finally awoke to the need of forging an 
active foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia. 
III. Before WWII  
Until March 1949, the United States did not have an 
embassy in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. There was a 
consulate for Americans in Dhahran, which had been 
dispatched to serve Casoc workers and there was a legation 
at Jeddah, more than 800 kilometers away from Riyadh24. 
Ibn Saud’s Kingdom was by no means very high on the 
political agenda of the American government. And why 
should it? In 1938, 60% of the world’s petroleum came from 
the United States25. In comparison to past decades, this was 
                     
24 Bronson 2006, 1 





   







































even a rather modest proportion from the American 
perspective. It was common sense to consider oil an 
American thing, something that America sells to the world, 
and to many “this appeared to be the natural order of 
things”26. In 1936, the American Consul General at 
Alexandria Leland Morris had been sent to Saudi Arabia 
upon the lobbying pressure of Socal to assess the 
desirability of establishing proper political representation in 
Saudi Arabia. In his report from March 23rd 1937 he clearly 
stated that “the development of American interests does not 
warrant the establishment of any sort of official 
representation at Jedda at the time”27. So at this point in 
time, not even a lower diplomat stationed in the region spoke 
in favor if intensifying relations with Saudi Arabia, leave 
alone his superiors. Motivated functionaries have a tendency 
of overestimating the impact and importance of their field of 
work for the larger organization and its goals, but not even at 
the staff level was Saudi Arabia perceived as that important 
yet. However, American interests grew rapidly in the course 
of 1938 as a corollary of the abovementioned successful 
drillings in Dammam.  
III.1 Before WWII – Domestic American Development 
On January 24th and 25th 1938, the Governors of the oil-
producing American states held a conference at Hot 
Springs, Arkansas. Governor E. W. Marland of Oklahoma 
had suggested to the President already on December 29th, 
1937, that representatives of the Departments of Navy, 
Commerce, and Interior be designated to attend this 
conference, but the President replied on January 19th, 1938, 
that he had sent E. B. Swanson, Associate Director of the 
Petroleum Conservation Division of the Department of the 
Interior to attend the meeting and prepare a report28. The 
President forwarded this dossier to the Departments of Navy 
and Commerce, and commented that “The report in regard 
                     
26 Anderson 1981, I) 
27 “Secretary of State Messersmith to Minister Fish, May 24, 1939..” United 
States Department of State. The Far East; The Near East and Africa 
Volume IV (1939). Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic 
Papers, 1939, 824. University of Wisconsin Digital Collection. 
<http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-
idx?type=browse&scope=FRUS.FRUS1> 
28“Roosevelt to Doughton and Vinson, Feb 3 1938.” President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s Office Files, 1933-1945. Part 3: Departmental 
Correspondence Files, Reel 2 Frame 709-710 (microfilm edition, 






































to reserves is somewhat more alarming than I [Roosevelt] 
had previously believed” 29. In his paper on the conference 
which was called to study the development of future oil 
demand and the domestic capabilities to meet that demand, 
Swanson reported that in the next twenty years an amount 
of oil equal to that of the past eighty years would have to be 
discovered in the United States to meet assumed demand30. 
Without new discoveries, the known oil fields would merely 
provide enough crude to fully meet the expected demand for 
four more years. The bottom-line message from the 
conference as conveyed by the report was that known drilled 
reserves were only able to fuel domestic demand until 
November 1941. The conference discussed all this based on 
the findings of an Oklahoma geologist named Alex W. 
McCoy.  
 However, at that time the implications for political 
action were seen primarily on the domestic level. “We can 
prevent that […] waste that occurs underground after the 
discovery of every new oil field. We can encourage or 
discourage the drilling of new wells” Governor Marland 
stated at the conference31. President Roosevelt himself was 
only interested in the report against the backdrop of the 
question whether to put a small tax on crude petroleum32. 
Again: The USA at the time still produced 60% of the world 
petroleum and Saudi Arabia not even 1%33. But these two 
correspondences can be seen as early tokens of the 
development that was to take place a few years later. On 
one hand there was a renewed and growing concern about 
depletion of domestic reserves and on the other hand there 
was growing private American activity in Saudi Arabia – 
activity that increasingly seemed to be more than just 
another marginal discovery and that was additionally 
politicized by apparent Axis interest in the region in general 
and Saudi Arabia in particular. Since the Dammam drillings 
                     
29 Ibid. 
30 “Ickes to Roosevelt, Feb 2 1938.” President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
Office Files, 1933-1945. Part 3: Departmental Correspondence Files, 
Reel 2 Frame  696 (microfilm edition, Roosevelt Study Center, 
Middelburg) 
“Report: Swanson about Oil Conservation Conference, Jan 29 1938.” 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Office Files, 1933-1945. Part 3: 
Departmental Correspondence Files, Reel 2 Frames  697-708 (microfilm 
edition, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg) 
31 Ibid. 
32 “Roosevelt to Doughton and Vinson, Feb 3 1938.” President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s Office Files, 1933-1945. Part 3: Departmental 
Correspondence Files, Reel 2 Frame 709 (microfilm edition, Roosevelt 
Study Center, Middelburg) 





   







































1938, it was clear that beneath the sands of Ibn Saud’s 
desert lay crude oil in commercial quantity. But this alone did 
not suffice to give a country geopolitical significance.  
III.2 Before WWII – Saudi Arabia Looming Larger 
In June 1939, the U.S. Secretary of state Cordell Hull 
requested a new assessment of the situation in Saudi 
Arabia. Meanwhile, the Germans, Italians, and Japanese 
had made advances toward Ibn Saud to obtain a 
concession34. Besides this, the extension of the concession 
to cover virtually all of Saudi Arabia was a factor that led the 
American Minister Fish in Cairo to recommend C. Hull to 
accredit him himself to Saudi Arabia. He reported that the 
“King says he has faith in the United States” and that “the 
Japanese, Italians and Germans have in mind additional 
territory as well as concessions” and that the King “feels that 
to grant the Petroleum Development Limited another 
concession would be to give the British a further grip on his 
country.35 Following up on this telegram, the American 
Minister Resident in Iraq Knabenshue recommended to the 
Secretary of State that because of the now proven strong 
American oil interest in Saudi Arabia, and especially so 
given the Axis attempts to gain a foothold there, it would be 
“desirable in my [Knabenshue’s] opinion that we now enter 
into formal diplomatic relations with that state”36. Resting on 
these documents, Cordell Hull wrote to FDR on June 30th 
1939: “I concur in the proposals made by our 
representatives at Cairo and Baghdad, and I recommend 
that our Minister to Egypt and his staff be also accredited to 
King Ibn Saud and that diplomatic relations be established 
                     
34 “Secretary of State Messersmith to Minister Fish, May 24, 1939.” United 
States Department of State. The Far East; The Near East and Africa 
Volume IV (1939). Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic 
Papers, 1939, 825. <University of Wisconsin Digital Collection. 
<http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS 
idx?type=browse&scope=FRUS.FRUS1.> 
35 “Fish to Secretary of State, June 21, 1939.” United States Department of 
State. The Far East; The Near East  and Africa Volume IV (1939). 
Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1939, 826-27. 
University of Wisconsin Digital Collection. 
<http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS 
idx?type=browse&scope=FRUS.FRUS1.> 
36 “Knabenshue to Secretary of State, June 21, 1939.” United States 
Department of State. The Far East; The Near East and Africa Volume IV 
(1939). Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1939, 








































with his Government”37. The President answered in the 
affirmative and a legation was dispatched to Jeddah. But 
still, the degree to which Roosevelt minded and prioritized 
this issue may be read out of the laconic wording of his 
approving answer: “Excellent idea – OK FDR”38. On 
February 1st 1940 then, Bert Fish would present his 
credentials to Ibn Saud in Jeddah and therewith officially 
open diplomatic relations in the name of the USA39.  
III.3 Before WWII – Strategic Considerations 
Besides the reason of proportion that might have led FDR to 
the conclusion that Saudi Arabian oil was negligible for now, 
there was also another reason for the government to stand 
by and remain inactive in the context of Saudi Arabia. 
Though the primary presidential sources prior to the war do 
not yield any such content, it can be treated as rather 
probable that FDR was well aware of the fact that Ibn Saud’s 
suspiciousness of any potential political designs on his 
country by Western powers made it strategically advisable 
for the political branch to stay out of relations with the 
Kingdom as much as possible: It was known even to the 
media in 1939 that Ibn Saud’s evaluation of the imperial 
powers was that “none of them is to be trusted”. The New 
York Times wrote that he “prefers to give all rights in the 
entire Kingdom to the American company for much less than 
he could have had from others because he is certain that it 
is a purely business proposition and that the United States 
has no political designs on his country”40. Hence, even if 
there is no evidence of American higher politicians being 
                     
37 “Hull to Roosevelt, June 30, 1939.” United States Department of State. 
The Far East; The Near East and Africa Volume IV (1939). Foreign 
Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1939, 828. University 
of Wisconsin Digital Collection. <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-
bin/FRUS/FRUS- idx?type=browse&scope=FRUS.FRUS1.> 
38 “Hull to Roosevelt, June 30, 1939.” United States Department of State. 
The Far East; The Near East and Africa Volume IV (1939). Foreign 
Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1939, 828. University 
of Wisconsin Digital Collection. <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-
bin/FRUS/FRUS- idx?type=browse&scope=FRUS.FRUS1.> 
39 “Diplomatic Contact Made With Ibn Saud.” New York Times (1857- 
Current file), Feb 6, 1940. Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES. 
Proquest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2005), 15. 
Consulted at the RSC Middelburg 
40 Levy, Joseph M. “U.S. Company Wins Arabian Oil Grant.” New York 
Times (1857- Current file), Aug 8, 1939. Wireless to THE NEW YORK 
TIMES. Proquest Historical Newspapers. The New York Times (1851-






   







































aware of the strategic implications of Ibn Saud’s diplomatic 
aloofness, it can be assumed that his suspicion was well 
known to all of them and that the fact that it went 
unmentioned in the documents is very much due to its 
simply being a commonplace that went without saying. This 
assumption is not to imply though that American policy 
towards Saudi Arabia was substantially influenced by the 
knowledge of the mentioned suspicion. 
 Awareness of the dimension of tapped and 
untapped reserves in Saudi Arabia grew not only on the 
American side. Ibn Saud, whose dependence on pilgrimage 
revenues was unaltered, began to see a potential 
deliverance of his financial problems. However, the King was 
in desperate need for money not years down the road, but 
needed constant bottle-feeding to even just sustain his 
regime (leave alone stabilize it) every year. This put a dual 
pressure on the oil companies: The contingency that his 
regime might collapse had worried the oilmen since the 
signing of the concession, because unless a benevolent 
successor would replace Ibn Saud, the concession would 
cease to exist with his reign. Upon that, the King routinely 
requested royalty advances from his American partners, 
imposing costs on them beyond the expenses necessitated 
by the development of their project, which was still in the 
pre-amortization phase after all. The companies were under 
severe financial pressure. The war to come would not 




IV. Early WWII – Difficulties and Dynamism 
 
IV.1 Financial troubles 
By 1940 returns on the Arab venture were insignificant, while 
$30,115,241 total had been devoured by the green-field-
investment into the on-location facilities and $5,515,652 had 
been paid in royalty advances beyond due yearly royalty 
payments. These funds were desperately needed, but 
insufficient to buy acquiescence from the local tribal leaders. 






































last-resort Britain in 1940 and a staggering $5,285,500 in 
194141. Given that it was a matter of fact that the British did 
not habitually act out of untarnished philanthropy in the 
Middle East, it did not take a lot of political insitinct on any 
side to see the looming danger of future imperial claims to a 
quid-pro-quo, should this tendency continue. British funds 
would stabilize Ibn Saud, but they would not come without 
strings attached. Socal and Texaco were by no means poor 
companies, but their funds did not suffice to continuously 
bail out a deficient desert Kingdom or compete in influence 
with the British government – particularly so when there was 
a world war to weather and to win: Thinking patterns on the 
American side had shifted back under such circumstances 
from long-shot investment targets such as Saudi Arabia to 
better-protected and tapped reserves—i.e. American 
deposits. It was the sensible Allied consensus that 
capacities and funds were needed for maximum 
performance today and not for maximum reaping tomorrow. 
On top of that, Saudi Arabia’s Dhahran oilfields were 
subjected to an attack by the Italian airforce42, adding to the 
threat-perception created by E. Rommel’s Afrikakorps and 
as a corollary also adding to the reluctance to develop 
Dhahran and Dammam. It goes without saying that this did 
not improve the financial situation of Casoc’s owners. 
 All this and the limited tanker capacities available 
to ship crude or refined oil out of the Persian Gulf to make 
money contributed to the exacerbation and stronger impact 
of Ibn Saud’s demands for royalty advancements from 
exactly these increasingly hard-pressed owners, Socal and 
Texaco. Ibn Saud himself had no other choice but to be 
demanding, because with the advent of war, pilgrimage 
revenues were plunging again. In January 1941, Casoc 
President Davies informally promised the Kingdom another 
$6,000,000, but he sent James A. Moffett, Casoc chairman 
and personal friend of Roosevelt’s, to obtain the funds from 
the American government. 
 
                     
41 U.S. Congress, Petroleum Arrangements with Saudi Arabia,  25381-382 
42 Cianfarra, Camille M. “Bahrein Is Raided.” New York Times (1857- 
Current file), Oct 21, 1940. By telephone to THE NEW YORK TIMES. 





   







































IV.2 Bringing the US Government into Play 
On April 9th 1941, Moffett met up with FDR to probe the 
latter’s basic mood, and succeeded in making the President 
request a more detailed memorandum. On April 16th then, 
he formally presented the matter. In his letter and attached 
memorandum43, he acquainted Roosevelt with the oilmen’s 
view of the situation. He wrote about the “practically 
disappeared” pilgrimage revenues and about the companies’ 
conservative estimation of an appropriate minimal budget for 
Saudi Arabia of $10,000,000. He recommended that the US 
government give $6,000,000 annually to Ibn Saud for the 
next five years by purchasing petroleum from the King 
through Casoc. Moffet modestly predicted that “we believe 
that unless this is done, and soon, this independent 
Kingdom, and perhaps with it the entire Arab world, will be 
thrown into chaos”. In the memorandum, Moffett invokes that 
Ibn Saud is “strongly pro-Ally” and that “no other man in the 
Arab countries, nor among Moslems the world over, 
commands prestige equal to his.”44 He closes by proposing 
to FDR that “the State Department approach the British not 
only to increase the amount of money which the British have 
been advancing to the King […] but also to request the 
British to continue to make such advances in sufficient 
amount, which, added to those made by the United States 
Government, plus any other revenue received by the King, 
will total approximately $10,000,000 per year.” Having 
nothing but the good cause of the Allies in mind, Moffett 
adds that “any British advances should be on a political and 
military basis and should not involve their getting any oil 
from this concession, the British at the present time being 
well supplied from Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain, etc.” 45 Without 
strings attached, British pound sterling were welcome after 
all. The oil was to be used by the Navy and the rest was to 
be resold through private channels, coincidentally covering 
the marketing areas of Socal and Texaco. 
                     
43 “Moffett to Roosevelt, April 16, 1941.” President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
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 The State Department commented in a 
memorandum46 that Moffett’s estimation of $10,000,000 for 
a minimal annual Saudi budget was reasonable and that the 
King’s former sources of revenue, the pilgrimage and 
customs, had been “effectively dried up by the existing 
situation”. The memorandum stresses Ibn Saud’s 
importance as “the outstanding figure in the Arab world 
today”47 and his sympathy for the Allied cause, stating that 
“since Ibn Saud’s influence is great in the Arab world a good 
cause can be made out in favor of granting him financial 
support”48. The memorandum approves the idea of 
approaching the British over the cause of raising their 
payments to the King and brings into play the alternative of 
channeling money to him through the Lend-Lease Act49. It is 
also suggested that Lend-Lease help could be combined 
with Moffet’s proposal depending on the usefulness of the 
refined products50. 
 On May 20th 1941, Secretary of the Navy Frank 
Knox wrote to Roosevelt what he thought about Moffett’s 
memorandum, which Roosevelt had forwarded to him for 
analysis and closer consideration. Knox had an investigation 
done by Rear Admiral and Director of the Naval Petroleum 
Reserves Stuart and based on the latter’s memorandum 
from May 17th 194151 and he came to the conclusion that 
Saudi oil at large was not suitable for Navy use, because it 
had an octane number below minimum requirements for 
military vehicles in general and especially airplanes. The 
Diesel available from Saudi Arabia was also not useful for 
the Navy, because it contained more than one percent of the 
corrosive element sulfur. He closed his letter to Roosevelt 
with the words: 
 “I appreciate the gravity of the situation in the 
Middle East and if needful, would be glad to see the small 
amount of money under question devoted to securing the 
military support of King Ibn Saud. I do not believe, however, 
that there is any sound business reason for mixing that help 
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up with the purchase of the type of oil produced in that 
field.”52 
 
IV.3 A Failed Attempt 
Following this, the President continued to be “anxious to find 
a way to do something about this matter”53, but in summer 
1941, no way was found to fund Ibn Saud directly. The 
United States were a democracy after all and had to follow 
the rule of law and “just how we could call that outfit a 
‘democracy’ I don’t know”54 wrote Harry Hopkins to Jesse 
Jones. Many ways were considered to get money into Saudi 
Arabia, besides Lend-Lease, an Export-Import Bank loan, 
and a Reconstruction Finance Company loan55. Harry L. 
Hopkins proposed confidentially to Jesse Jones, 
Administrator of the Federal Loan Agency, to “use his 
royalties on the tips he will get in the future on the pilgrims to 
Mecca”56. Roosevelt ultimately wrote to J. Jones on July 18th 
that Saudi Arabia was “a little far afield” for the US57. On July 
22nd 1941, Jesse Jones wrote to Hopkins that there “appears 
to be no legal way that we can help the King so, with the 
approval of the President, I suggested to Lord Halifax and 
Sir Frederick Phillips , also Mr. Neville Butler, that they 
arrange to continue taking care of the King”58. It remains to 
add that a contemporary observer opined that the true 
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reason for the proposal’s failure were concerns over rousing 
isolationists’ fears of getting over-involved abroad59.  
 But whatever might have been the reason for the 
decision in 1941 to leave the field to the British, the very fact 
of it illustrates that Saudi Arabia as a country and its oil 
reserves in particular were not a primary strategic concern of 
the United States government then. Throughout the 1941 
discussion, the concern about Saudi oil is about its usability 
as a bargain, never about the very reservoirs’ strategic or 
even geostrategic meaning.  
To return to the convergence of the two underlying 
developments that we mentioned above: Neither the 
depletion fears in the United States nor the awareness of the 
extent of Saudi crude oil deposits had grown sufficiently in 
1941 to spark a real shift in paradigm in the White House 
yet. If Ibn Saud were to be stabilized then it would be in 
order to stabilize the region, to sustain an ally in the war, and 
to gain a prestigious potential intercessor in the Palestine 
question – not to consolidate control of a concession. In 
1941, Saudi Arabia was considered to have a tertiary 
meaning to the interest of the USA at best, and if it was of 
interest at all to the political leadership, it was not so for its 
oil, but for the prestige and loyalty of its monarch and the 
usefulness of these qualities to the war effort. For the time 
being, the oil companies had to resort to making plausible to 
King Ibn Saud that it was only American Lend-Lease funds 
to the British that made the increased British payments to 
Saudi Arabia possible. They sought to make their role 
appear as large as possible in this indirect support by the 
United States to the Kingdom via the British, and they tried 
to stress that it was essentially the oil companies who had 
engineered this triangular payment scheme. This modus 
vivendi was suboptimal at best for Socal and Texaco, but it 
was operable for now and ensured Ibn Saud’s existence as 
King of Saudi Arabia and therewith the continued security of 
their concession and finances. 
 
IV.4 Depletion Concerns Renewed 
The idea that American oil deposits were being depleted 
was not new. But in late 1941, the discussion, which had 
hitherto been framed in the higher political strata as having 
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merely domestic dimensions, was enriched by a new factor: 
In his memorandum of October 15th60, Deputy Petroleum 
Coordinator Ralph K. Davies laid out that “in proportion to 
the demand for petroleum products the petroleum reserves 
ratio of the United States proper has been diminishing 
steadily since 1933”. He follows up with this statement::  
We in the United States must face the prospect of 
acquiring and holding sufficient additional reserves to 
supply our military and civilian needs in the years ahead, 
irrespective of whether such reserves are within the 
borders of the United States or not. That is to say, the 
United States must have extra-territorial petroleum 
reserves to guard against the day when our steadily 
increasing demand can no longer be met by our domestic 
supply.61 
 Though in this memorandum Davies aims his gaze 
at the reserves in Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and other 
Caribbean countries, one can safely claim that this 
memorandum is one of the early witnesses of a change of 
paradigm in the mentality of higher level American policy 
makers, since Harold L. Ickes brought the memorandum to 
the attention of President Roosevelt barely two months 
before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Ickes would continue to 
play a prominent role in pushing forward the awareness of 
this issue in all fervor and he came to be the man whose 
name should come to be associated with strong 
interventionist tendencies in the oil industry. The shift of 
policy towards Saudi Arabia that took place from 1941 until 
basically late 1943 and early 1944 is to a great extent 
connected to his name. 
 
IV.5 President under Increasing Pressure 
The following anecdote is basically the story of an attempt 
by a political hustler to jump-start his career. It can by no 
means be appraised as an episode of big historic 
significance, but deserves mentioning nonetheless, be it only 
to attest the changing zeitgeist of late 1941 and to serve as 
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an indicator or at least illustration of the fact that the said 
change was apparent not only to a select circle of high-
ranking politicians and entrepreneurs, but permeated the 
intelligentsia – slowly but irresistibly. 
 On October 24th, Princeton librarian J. P. Boyd 
wrote to FDR62 about a memorandum authored by a certain 
Nabih Amin Faris, Princeton faculty member. Faris reiterated 
in his text63 the Arab affinity to the democracies and their 
cause and especially to the non-imperial America. He wrote 
that the “passive good will or benevolent neutrality can be 
transformed into active good will”. He goes on that “the key 
man in the whole situation is this same Ibn Saud” and that 
“only America can do it”. He claims that the current 
representation, done by the American representative in 
Egypt, does “not go beyond the customary exchange of 
courtesies, an obsolete procedure in this time of active and 
aggressive diplomacy”. Given the necessity of having an on-
location diplomat to communicate with Ibn Saud “in his own 
tongue, with its own subtleties, shades of meaning, and 
niceties” Faris altruistically offers himself for the job, “by 
virtue of my father’s reputation” (his stepfather as he claims 
was a superregional Arab celebrity)64. Roosevelt makes 
himself very clear in his response: 
I desire to assure you and Mr. Faris that we are alive to 
the importance of King Ibn Saud in the present situation. 
[…] The question of accrediting a Minister individually to 
Saudi Arabia has already received careful consideration 
on several occasions, and if the desirability of such a step 
becomes clear, appropriate action will of course be taken. 
The Honorable Alexander Kirk […] plans to proceed to 
Saudi Arabia […] and with world conditions what they are 
it is unlikely that his visit will be limited to an exchange of 
courtesies.65  
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 Whatever the tonality of his response – it heralds 
that in disregard of the course of affairs in this year’s 
summer Ibn Saud’s shadow was getting longer in America. 
 
V. WWII – Change comes to America 
 
V.1 State getting in Motion 
In the course of 1942 the petroleum issue gained political 
momentum and relevance, as it is exemplified for instance 
by the 100 octane gasoline discussion66 between essentially 
FDR and Petroleum Coordinator Harold L. Ickes or, for that 
matter, by the inland pipeline discussion, too67. The Second 
World War made it crystal-clear to everybody that oil was a 
scarce resource and that the United States did not dispose 
of infinite deposits or logistic capacities to export oil and 
supply all allied armies and its own while retaining heated 
homes and open gas stations in the domestic realm.  
 A permanent legation and a consulate were 
established in Jeddah in April 1942 under James S. Moose, 
Jr. (he was to be promoted to become Minister Resident one 
year later). The USA also dispatched an agricultural mission 
under Karl Twitchell68 to Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, in 
August 1942, wartime air transit rights were negotiated with 
Ibn Saud69. Upon that, the head of the Division of Near 
Eastern Affairs Paul H. Alling initiated new action to make 
Saudi Arabia eligible for Lend-Lease support and wrote to 
Dean Acheson that “Dhahran gives every promise of being 
one of the world’s most important oilfields” and that it was 
“an American interest of highest importance”. He added that 
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“the British Government […] had been supplying extensive 
material assistance” and warned about a “definite possibility 
that the British […] would […] require a quid pro quo in 
petroleum rights at the end of the war”70. Acting Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson forwarded the memorandum to E.R. 
Stettinius, Jr., who turned to President Roosevelt on 
February 1st, 194371. In his memorandum of that date he 
lays out to FDR that Saudi Arabia is the only large Middle 
Eastern country that has not been made eligible yet for 
Lend-Lease Aid and further points to its strategic position 
across the direct air route to India and the Far East. Besides 
another reiteration of Ibn Saud’s sympathy for the cause of 
the Allies and the United Nations, he adduces the air route 
rights conceded to the United States. On February 18th the 
President sent a Presidential Directive to Stettinius stating 
that “I hereby find that the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to 
the defense of the United States” and he makes explicit that 
this is written to “enable you [Stettinius] to arrange for Lend-
Lease aid to the Government of Saudi Arabia”72. It is notable 
in this context that oil again seems to not have been of 
outstanding primary importance in the highest level decision-
making, even though it was by now well known that Saudi 
deposits at least matched those of Iran and Iraq. However, 
two days before he signed the order to Stettinius, Roosevelt 
had lunch with Harold Ickes, who noted in his diary that he 
discussed the matter of Saudi reserves with the President on 
that day73. But whatever be the real reason behind his final 
decision to sign the order, FDR paved the way for a barring 
of any potential British designs on Saudi Arabia based on 
financial pressure. Though Ibn Saud received help primarily 
as a monarch friendly to the Allied war effort, this help also 
secured the concession for the time being. Ickes, desiring for 
the government to gain equity shares in Saudi oil projects, 
had said to the President on the occasion of their lunch that 
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“the Government ought to have a financial interest in … [the] 
… American oil concession in Arabia, and that there would 
probably never be a better time to do it than now”74. But 
Ickes had to wait for another half year for the nationalization 
of American interests in Saudi Arabia to even be considered. 
  
V.2 Ibn Saud and the Middle East 
Ibn Saud had first turned to President Roosevelt in a letter 
from November 19th, 1938, about the Palestine Question, in 
which he made clear his standpoint that the Jews had no 
rightful claim to any lands in Palestine75. 
 In early 1943, A. Kirk visited Ibn Saud and the King 
made clear to him his current view of the Palestine question. 
He asked Kirk to convey to the President that he as the 
“leading Arab and Moslem,” had a “special interest in 
developments in Palestine” 76. He stated that the “Jews had 
been hostile to Arabs from time of Prophet Mohamed to 
present”77. In section one of his memorandum Kirk outlined 
Ibn Saud’s current stance that he remains silent to the 
subject of Jewish immigration so as not to force the 
President into a situation where the USA could merely 
choose whom to offend, Arabs or Jews. This was, however, 
not a sign of disinterest – on the contrary, the King wanted 
Roosevelt to know that his silence and inactivity is 
exclusively due to the situation of war and his great 
sympathy for the Allied cause, which he did not want to 
distract as long as the big game was being played. Kirk 
asked the President in Ibn Saud’s name whether on one 
hand he endorses this silence and on the other hand he 
asked Roosevelt to not act unilaterally or even only “respond 
favorably to the overtures of others” because his own silence 
then could be interpreted by third parties as apathy or 
disinterest. So Ibn Saud was more willing to remain inactive 
and acquiescent in the Palestine than he was willing to admit 
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publicly. What he conveyed to Roosevelt would have been a 
fatal blow to his prestige in the Moslem world, had it been 
publicized. Section two of the memorandum lays open Ibn 
Saud’s general Middle Eastern policy, whose cornerstones 
are disinterest in the acquisition of new territories on one 
hand and independence for Syria and Palestine as Arab and 
Moslem nations on the other. He was concerned about the 
abuse of “pan-Arabism as a means for formation of Iraq 
Palestine and Syria into a Hashemite bloc”78 (the Hashemite 
royal house of Iraq he perceived as traditionally hostile to the 
house of Saud). He had Kirk convey to Roosevelt his faith in 
the United States and their goodwill to not let such menace 
to his Kingdom materialize.   
 To understand Franklin D. Roosevelt’s later mutual 
fascination and friendship with Ibn Saud, the memorandum 
yields an interesting and amusingly enchanted passage by 
A. Kirk, whom the romantic desert monarch had apparently 
successfully put a spell on with his old-fashioned honor and 
sheer physical impressiveness (Ibn Saud towered 
somewhere between six foot two and six foot four and 
limped heavily due to nine serious battlefield wounds)79: 
In transmitting this message from Ibn Saud for the 
President, it is difficult if not impossible without incurring 
the criticisms of hyperbole or even emotionalisms, 
adequately to reflect the sincerity of the King and his 
profound conviction in the virtue of his own judgment. He 
is simple, honest and decisive and these qualities 
transcend the limited formula of his special experience. 
He believes that we are his friends and to him friendship 
bespeaks complete confidence. Compromise is 
inadmissible. He truly feels that his problems are ours 
and ours are his and in giving this message for the 
President, he confirmed throughout an absolute faith in 
the justice of the democracies and a conviction that the 
order which is to follow their victory will justify that faith.80 
The memorandum was forwarded to FDR by Cordell Hull on 
May 25th, 194381. 
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 On April 30th the King followed up with a personal 
sealed letter to Roosevelt82 with essentially the same 
holdings, but also bringing in a very pragmatic perspective 
by stating that even if Palestine were purged of all Arabs, it 
still could not absorb and be home to enough Jews so as to 
solve the Jewish problem. The King reminds FDR of his 
responding letter of January 9th, 1939, in which he did not 
tackle the Moslem claims made to Palestine in the 
abovementioned letter from November 19th 1938.  
 In his answer from May 26th 1943 (authored in the 
State Department) Roosevelt confirms the desirability of the 
said silence and assures the King that “in any case […] I 
assure Your Majesty that it is the view of the Government of 
the United States that no decision altering the basic situation 
of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with 
both Arabs and Jews”83. In another telegram dated June 
15th, the President confirms this basic assurance and adds 
that it appears desirable to him that “the Arabs and Jews 
interested in the question should come to a friendly 
understanding with respect of matters affecting Palestine 
through their own efforts prior to the termination of the 
war”84. 
  
V.3 Playing Games 
In his eleven-page memorandum of June 9th, Brigadier 
General Patrick Hurley reported from his long conference 
with Ibn Saud85. He, too, was evidently intrigued by the 
charismatic King and wrote: “Ibn Saud is the wisest and 
strongest of all the leaders I have met in the Arab states”86. 
Just as he had done with A. Kirk, the King had impressed his 
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American guest with claptrap: To put his guest on the 
grandstand, the King spectacularly dismissed all persons 
and advisers present at the conference except for his 
personal interpreter and the guest to have a “secret 
conference”87 with him. Given the repeated application of 
this move, one cannot help but suspect that it was part of a 
cunning medieval play designed to impress medium-ranking 
functionaries and to give them a taste of importance. But not 
only in his style of communication, also in its content does 
Ibn Saud make the impression of a diplomatically astute 
negotiator, able to play off the rivaling Western powers 
against each other: In the first-mentioned long 
memorandum, Hurley mentioned that the King has “great 
confidence in the United States” and that he “looks to 
America and to you [Roosevelt] for the benevolent friendship 
which his nation needs”. He added that “while the King did 
not express bitter hostility toward Britain, he expressed the 
opinion that the British government still intends to force 
imperialistic rule on the Arab states”88. So far, so good, but 
interestingly enough, that very same Ibn Saud would 
express in equal confidentiality and secretiveness to the 
British Minister Jordan that he “preferred Britain to guide the 
destinies of the Arab States rather than America … [because 
of Britain’s] … long record of co-operation with and 
friendship for the Arabs”89 and also that he was “cautious 
towards the Americans […] because […] the shadow of 
Zionism loom[ed] behind all their activities in the Middle 
East”90. Hence, looked at in the light of day, the seemingly 
archaic nobleman of honor knew the rules of the modern 
diplomatic game rather well and despite all rhetoric of 
genuine friendship was a realist when it came to foreign 
relations and their execution. Hurley wrote that “the King has 
stated definitely that he wishes the petroleum resources of 
Saudi Arabia to be developed by American interests only”91. 
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But to get the Americans to do so as fast and profitably as 
possible, it could not do any wrong to foster fears of British 
overtures to him, now, could it? This would not be the last 
time that Ibn Saud arranged for Anglo-American competition 
to play out in a way useful to his regime. In fact, it will be 
shown below that the King skillfully had the two Great 
Powers build up a virtual hostility over his favor, and the 
dimension of this competition was to be economic and 
financial aid to him. 
 However, it was not only the Saudi leader that 
wanted to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds at the 
same time. While enjoying the King’s cordialities and 
hospitality which the latter offered to his American guest 
because his hopes were high that his oil resources were 
being developed by “an American company or companies 
that would be completely subjected to the authority of Saudi 
Arabia rather than any other Government” Brigadier General 
Hurley wrote on the very same occasion: 
I am, however, rather inclined to the opinion that 
eventually American oil companies developing foreign 
resources must be subjected to a degree of supervision 
by the American government. Such companies also must 
have a degree of protection in foreign countries by their 
own government. Finally, the American government will 
have to acquire a degree of ownership of American 
companies operating in foreign territory sufficient to 
assure governmental supervision without destroying 
private ownership or private initiative.92 
Petroleum Coordinator Ickes would aspire to much more 
than that in the period to come.  
 For the time being, a little bit of political fuzz was 
created over P. Hurley’s visit to Ibn Saud in August by a 
Jewish American called Drew Pearson. The latter published 
in several newspapers a column with the following 
statement: “Ibn Saud, now recognized as the most powerful 
of all Arabs, gave Hurley some strong words against the 
Jews in Palestine, saying he was determined to drive them 
from all Arab lands. Hurley reported that he had told Ibn 
Saud diplomatically that he was in agreement.”93 
 Hurley received hate mail from various Zionists as 
a corollary and was also threatened by Senators with a 
Congressional Investigation. He noted that the Jewish attack 
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on him was “absurd” and that he had not answered any of 
the letters. He assured Roosevelt that the King has never 
made any such statement and that he never replied with 
such statement to the King94. Roosevelt, addressing the 
Brigadier General as “Dear Pat” 95, backed him up against 
the attacks and forwarded the entire correspondence to the 
Secretary of State, commenting that “I think that in some 
way the State Department should issue a public warning to 
the general effect that Mr. Pearson is not to be believed in 
anything that he writes”96.  
 Whatever be the truth in this matter – this little 
episode, its penetration all the way up to the President, and 
the latter’s degree of interest in it indicates the increasing 
politicization of the Middle East and Saudi Arabia, though 
much of its explosiveness is ultimately rather imputable to 
the relevance of the Palestine question in combination with 
the role that American Jews played in politics. But 
nonetheless, it shows quite well from how many sides the 
President and others with policy-making competence were 
under siege, narrowing down their discretion. Saudi Arabia, 
its oil, and its leader’s opinion on the Palestine problem 
became increasingly important to American politics and 
American public opinion. 
 
V.4 State Activity Soaring 
British activity in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East was 
welcomed and even encouraged at the beginning of the 
world war by America’s officials. However, US ambitions 
there as well as American perceptions of British activity in 
the area took a very different shape in 1943. The British 
were increasingly seen as self-interested rivals who might 
encroach upon Ibn Saud and his concession by levying their 
financial and economic influence97. This perception was at 
least welcomed, if not actively conjured up by Ibn Saud. 
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Awareness of the depletion issue was rising too, as the war 
illustrated even to the least educated that the future 
belonged to machines. The depletion of domestic reserves 
was getting more acutely visible due to the war. Finally, the 
international implications of this were getting to be 
appreciated in highest level politics. On June 14th, 1943, the 
Secretary of State wrote a memorandum to the President 
building up on a similar memorandum from June 8th 
authored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and one from Admiral 
Leahy from June 11th. The basic topic was the arisen 
necessity for the USA to control crude oil deposits abroad: 
“For many years past the Department of State has 
recognized the imperative necessity, now set forth in the 
memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that this country 
possess adequate foreign petroleum reserves – both in 
peace and war situations.”98 
 On June 26th then, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Acting Secretary of the 
Navy James Forrestal, and the notorious Harold L. Ickes, 
Secretary of the Interior co-authored a short but clear text for 
the President that had originated from a meeting in the office 
of Justice Byrnes99. They wrote about the “imperative need 
to assure adequate foreign reserves“ and – for the first time 
this clear connection is made – they “gave particular 
attention to the situation in Saudi Arabia”. Most importantly 
they urged for the “creation of a Petroleum Reserves 
Corporation”. The national budget deadline being July 1st, 
the President – curiously enough – had apparently not even 
read the letter yet on the 29th of June100. In the enclosure to 
their letter the decisive ends is formulated: 
The interest to be acquired by our government in the 
Saudi Arabian oil reserves shall be the ownership of 
100% of the stock of the corporation now owning the oil 
concessions”101. Later that day FDR succinctly 
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responded: “I approve this and ask that it be carried out 
today, in view of the deadline. FDR”102  
Thus, the Petroleum Reserves Corporation was created. 
 “The purpose of the corporation is to acquire 
petroleum, petroleum products and petroleum reserves 
outside the continental United States. […] The objective is to 
look ahead, in the misfortunate event of a prolonged war.”103 
The last sentence was added by FDR to J. Jones’ proposal 
to make a public statement concerning its creation and then 
approved. But the PRC’s more concrete purpose was the 
acquisition of Casoc, just as H. Ickes, Undersecretary of the 
Navy William C. Bullit, Secretary of the Navy F. Knox, and 
Secretary of War H. L. Stimson had hoped. The PRC was to 
form effectively what the British had with the AIOC. Opposed 
to this British-imperial interventionism was – among of 
course the independent competing oil companies, who 
feared competition with a company backed by the American 
government104. He favored a negotiated treaty with the 
British to develop rationally and equitably the oilfields of the 
Middle East, just the way B. H. Jackson proposed to J. T. 
Duce (see below).  
 Meanwhile, the President sent a certain Colonel 
Harold Hoskins to Ibn Saud to discuss on his behalf “matters 
of mutual interest” with the King105. The former’s 
memorandum of conversation sent to Roosevelt on August 
16th, 1943, restated the King’s view that an Arab Federation 
after the war would be basically in his will but that since he 
did not intend to extend his reign to Transjordan, Syria, or 
Palestine it would for the sake of balance be undesirable to 
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allow the Hashemite family to do so106. In a longer 
memorandum of September 27th Hoskins (who the King was 
very impressed with, see Letter from Ibn Saud to FDR107) 
explicates his thoughts and experiences. He firstly deals with 
what has been called Ibn Saud’s silence above. Ibn Saud 
had been approached in the meantime by Harry St. John 
Philby who in the name of Dr. Chaim Weizmann had 
effectively tried to bribe the Saudi King into acquiescence 
concerning Jewish immigration to Palestine108. Hoskins 
clarified on behalf of the King that such overtures were 
fraudulent to the King and that it was only his loyalty to the 
Allied and American cause that had kept him quiet. Hoskins 
also conveyed that the King resented “even the implication, 
which of course he did not believe, that you [Roosevelt] had 
any part in the attempted bribe”109. Besides this purely 
political or diplomatic issue, the paper stated that “we are for 
the first time developing some fundamental postwar 
economic interests of a long-term character in the Middle 
East and particularly in Saudi Arabia”110. But besides this 
short remark, in his entire eleven-page-memorandum oil and 
economic issues are not of major concern. Hoskins e.g. 
compared the organizational structure of the British and the 
French in the Middle East to that of the Americans, 
concluding that America has to better coordinate her 
activities in that region (and rightfully so: As late as 1944 the 
American Department of State disposed of merely three 
language experts in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs!111). 
All in all, the supreme importance of Saudi oil is not 
accounted for in this or most of the other reports from 
diplomats dispatched to Saudi Arabia. Importance is indeed 
attached to Saudi Arabia, but in the context of Ibn Saud’s 
prestige and its usefulness to settle the Palestinian problem. 
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Hoskin’s mission to find out Ibn Saud’s willingness to 
acquiesce into the installment of a Jewish state was 
successful insofar as the King categorically refused to even 
meet Dr. Weizmann over this matter. It must be noted here 
that later documents by the latter and by Philby draw a 
different picture of the King’s categorical attitude. On 
December 13th, 1943, Weizmann wrote to Sumner Welles 
about the matter:  
As you will see from the enclosed letter from Mr. Philby, 
he had put his schemer [for buying acquiescence] before 
Ibn Saud on January 8th, 1940. Ibn Saud replied that he 
would consider it, if it came to him as a firm offer, but that 
he would disavow Mr. Philby if this attitude was 
prematurely divulged. Clearly he feared opening himself 
to attack by rivals in the Arab world on account of a 
scheme which might never reach the stage of practical 
consideration.112 
 Philby himself wrote to Weizmann that the King 
had told him “that some such arrangements might be 
possible in appropriate future circumstances,” and that he 
himself “should not breathe a word about the matter to 
anyone – least of all to any Arab” 113. This paper does not 
have the ambition to judge which of these positions 
approaches the true considerations of the Arab leader 
better; it shall merely serve to expose the conflicting realities 
and the “torturous ways of diplomacy”, as Philby put it. He 
closed with the words that “I guarantee (for what my 
guarantee is worth) that the suggested firm offer will be 
accepted if made by any reasonably intelligent person of 
indisputable goodwill on behalf of the two governments 
concerned.   
 In the same summer 1943, James Terry Duce, at 
the time Director of the Foreign Division of the Petroleum 
Administration for War and Vice President of Casoc, met up 
with B. H. Jackson of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Ltd. 
He reported that Jackson “had thought that it might be an 
advantageous time for the British and American 
governments to get together to discuss the entire problem of 
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petroleum in the Near East now because he doubted if after 
the war a suitable arrangement could be consummated”114. 
In a memorandum that he attached to his Aide Memoire he 
wrote to Ickes that he believed geologists could make an 
estimate of the deposits in the Persian Gulf well in excess of 
the 20 billion barrels proved in the United States, were they 
given access to comprehensive data on the region. Invoking 
the fact that this area was “the center of world prosperity and 
civilization … [until] … the Genghis Khan’s generals 
destroyed the irrigation systems of Mesopotamia” he thought 
that this “area will have a tremendous influence on the 
commerce and well being of the world” and that “some steps 
should be taken by these governments to guide the 
development of the future”115. Jackson and the AIOC 
increasingly feared for the controllability of the postwar 
market and – in case of excessive competition and therewith 
dropping prices and royalties – for the stability of the entire 
Middle East. Cheap oil meant low royalty payments and low 
royalty payments meant potential instability. From a 
geopolitical point of view, there was also the urge to involve 
and commit the Americans in the vital Middle East against 
the backdrop of potential Russian ambitions116. But for now, 
the mentality in Washington was of a different kind, powered 
by the ardent H. Ickes and his PRC, who took up the fight 
against the oil companies and tried to purchase them 
instead of searching for a treaty agreement with the British 
to bring order into a free Middle Eastern market. However, if 
the administration of such an agreement were to “fall within 
the lap of the British and American Oil Agencies rather than 
under the auspices of the State Department”117, Ickes would 
actually also consider this approach. We would be so 
courageous as to speculate that Harold Ickes would have 
been willing to be an active driving force behind any design 
that included oil and the American state. It has been 
speculated that all later fuzz about the Petroleum Reserves 
Corporation was ultimately not intended by Ickes to succeed 
as an end in itself but to serve as a means of direct pressure 
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on the British in bilateral talks over an Anglo-American oil 
treaty. This view would be consistent with Ickes’ later activity 
in the policy-finding process to the effect of such a bilateral 
treaty, even though this process took place in a time of grim 
fighting between Ickes and the PRC on one hand and Hull 
and the Department of State (then favoring the bilateral 
agreement) on the other (see below).  
 Given all these developments, the year 1943 can 
be seen as the single most important year in terms of 
shifting awareness and policy towards Saudi Arabia. It is in 
this year that Harold Ickes started to champion his cause of 
an active state in oil matters more assertively. On August 
18th he wrote to the President that “next to winning the war, 
the most import matter before us as a Nation was the world 
oil situation” 118. He added that “our supplies are falling 
below demand. Therefore, it behooves us to find supplies of 
crude oil elsewhere.” Ickes had already pressured Roosevelt 
on June 10th the way he had done the past winter by writing 
that “by the end of 1944 we shall be unable to produce 
sufficient crude oil to meet the petroleum requirements of the 
armed services and […] civilian economy” 119. He had 
pushed for “immediate action to acquire proprietory interest 
in foreign petroleum reserves”. British interference of a 
“sovereign character” was to be matched by American 
intervention of an “equally sovereign character” on the 
Peninsula. The idea of having the Petroleum Reserves 
Corporation buy a “controlling interest by the U.S. 
Government in Saudi Arabian oil concession” had been 
around since the abovementioned memorandum pertinent to 
the topic by the Joint Chiefs of Staff120 (which had helped to 
get the PRC started).  
 But now that Ickes had a political instrument in his 
hand to do the job (i.e. the PRC) he had to realize that many 
people ardently resisted his urge to nationalize Casoc. 
Already prior to the final proposal to Roosevelt there had 
been quite some infighting between majorly Ickes and Knox 
on one hand and Dr. Herbert Feis on the other, who had 
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(without ultimate success) championed an option-contract 
model that would potentially have been more digestible for 
the competing oil firms. Feis had succeeded in pushing 
through a State Department veto for any overseas action of 
the PRC (“The Corporation shall not embark on any major 
projects or undertakings without receiving the prior approval 
of the Secretary of State”121) but Hull had not shown himself 
very willing to back Feis in the question of how the PRC 
would go about122, and so it had happened that Ickes’ side 
had prevailed and that an interest was to be purchased in 
Casoc and Gulf Oil. 
 Multiple chains of events contributing to the 
outcome and contradicting primary sources make it 
inappropriate within the framework of this essay to try to 
untangle how exactly the PRC failed in its attempt to 
purchase Casoc – but it did123. In how far Socal and Texaco 
were willing to sell nothing at all or only a minority interest to 
the PRC is unclear. The entire PRC affair was minted by 
political infighting – be it over staffing, funding, military 
relevance, or the actual negotiations with the lobbying-prone 
oil corporations. The role that Socony-Vacuum and Jersey 
played is unresolved and the interaction with a plan by the 
Army-Navy Petroleum Board to construct a $100,000,000 
refinery in Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia124, is complicated and 
hard to penetrate without legal knowledge. In any case, the 
attempts to purchase Casoc failed in October. The State 
Department did not really support the PRC, the take-over 
candidates resisted the PRC’s plan as much as their 
competitors opposed it, and the public were critical of such 
interventionist policies as well. Although this is pure 
speculation, a British-style active role of the American 
government would most probably not even have made the 
United States’ position in Saudi Arabia better. Ibn Saud 
mistrusted the American government much less than the 
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British, but he was suspicious nonetheless. It is up to 
counterfactual historians to determine whether the total 
benefits would have out-weighed the disadvantages. But it 
can be treated as certain that the PRC’s purchase of Casoc 
would also have provoked irritations in the foreign relations 
with Saudi Arabia. 
 When it became apparent that Ickes’ mission with 
the PRC was abortive, Roosevelt requested a detailed 
memorandum on the landscape of concessions and 
concessionaires in the Middle East. He received such a 
memorandum by Under Secretary of State Stettinius on 
November 8th, 1943125. The military necessity to erect a 
refinery in that region of the world was unaltered and the 
memorandum made it very clear to the President that 
America had a stake there through Casoc, the Bahrain 
Petroleum Company, and the Kuwait Oil Company. 
Stettinius’ memorandum mentioned the possibility of as 
many as 50 billion barrels of crude oil in Saudi Arabia and 
closed that it is “desirable that some general understanding 
be reached between the British and American Governments 
regarding Middle Eastern petroleum questions”. Secretary 
Hull followed up on that memorandum on December 8th with 
a short note that the Middle Eastern oil resources “cannot be 
adequately developed unless the United States and British 
Governments reach an agreement providing for close 
cooperation” 126. Ickes had failed and seemed to be 
politically defeated, so now it was Hull’s turn to solve the 
problem with the approach he favored – and as a glaring 
political victor in the internal fight with Ickes. Hull informed 
the President in the said follow-up letter that on December 
2nd, he had invited the British government to designate 
representatives for talks on that matter and also that the 
British had positively perceived his overture. The 
discussions were to be held on staff level. Ickes was not to 
sit at the table. 
 Far from being broken, Ickes subsequently wrote 
to the President on December 27th that he was “glad that 
Secretary Hull has started the ball rolling with the British,” 
and that he hoped that the “proposed conferences get going 
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speedily” 127. He also wrote that he will not feel like using Mr. 
Davies on this commission as his representative due to the 
latter’s former oil interest. Much rather, he would become a 
member of this commission himself, not only because of his 
“greater interest in the subject matter” and his “better 
advisory staff on oil”, but also because – as he puts it – “in a 
sense, this is my baby”. Ickes re-clarified his well-known 
position and sense of urgency in the matter, but C. Hull 
unflinchingly wrote to Roosevelt on January 1st, 1944, that 
he would designate the State Department’s Petroleum 
Adviser as chairman of the work-group and his Chief of the 
Near Eastern Division as second member and that Ickes 
should also send a subordinate128. Ickes of course 
fundamentally opposed in a memorandum to the President 
of January 4th 129. He wrote that he was “sure that nothing 
will come of discussions concerning this critical problem 
which are initiated at the staff level”. Ickes really believed in 
the importance of the Middle East as a key strategic region 
and he believed that a consensus with the ever-expansive 
British would have to be found on that region as long as the 
war was going on; otherwise this window in time would close 
again. He thought that the “oil problems in the Middle East 
require bold and vigorous action by the Governments 
concerned”. He closed with the words that the “detailed work 
can be handled through alternates; but the problems are of 
such magnitude and the only constructive answers are of 
such a scale as to require the prestige and direction of top-
ranking officials”. Ickes would prefer to meet up with Hull and 
FDR personally and to discuss with the British on cabinet 
level. 
 Hull shot back just one day later on January 5th 130. 
He reminded FDR that he had already given his consent to 
the proposal of December 8th and that he had also done so 
in response to his designations of January 1st. Hull went on 
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that it “is strongly felt that these conversations with the 
British should be conducted at the staff level as is done in 
the case of all similar international discussions of a technical 
nature”. The Secretary of State meant to keep Ickes off the 
oil matter, probably seeing his chance to fully usurp this 
prestigious subject for his Department. On that very same 5th 
of January 1944, Hull wrote directly to Harold Ickes131. Hull, 
who was among the initiators and original driving signatories 
behind the PRC, now diplomatically let Ickes know that he 
deemed the upcoming conversations with the British as a 
better means to achieve the ends of the PRC. He innocently 
continued that at the present point in time, it is impossible to 
determine whether any actions by the PRC to purchase any 
interest in any American oil company operating abroad 
would not perhaps jeopardize the talks with the British. Since 
the result of successful negotiations with the British would 
oust the PRC by solving the problem that is the latter’s right 
of existence, Hull indirectly asked Ickes to abort his mission 
altogether by stating that “negotiations of the Petroleum 
Reserves Corporation with the California Arabian Standard 
Oil Company and with the Gulf Oil Company, for the purpose 
of arranging participation by this Government in those 
companies or their foreign reserves, should be held in 
abeyance, and that no similar negotiations should be 
undertaken with any other company at this time”132. He 
closed by putting Ickes off with the words “If developments 
growing out of the forthcoming conversations with the British 
Government should indicate that negotiations of the 
aforementioned nature should be again considered or that 
some alternative course might be advantageously examined 
as being within the scope of operations of the Petroleum 
Reserves Corporation, the Department, of course, will be 
glad to discuss the subject through its representative on the 
Board of Directors of the Corporation.” 
 So Hull really wanted to use Ickes recent failure to 
cut him down to size and put him in his place – outside of 
foreign politics. Ickes should not interfere with foreign policy 
of any kind anymore; foreign oil was to be State Department 
matter now. Ickes of course responded in comparable 
verve133, reminding Hull that he had been one of the 
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initiators of the PRC and that Hull’s current behavior stood in 
contradiction to his past engagement and to presidential 
directives. He pointed out that the State Department must 
have been aware of the inevitability of talks with the British 
on the situation of oil in the Middle East and that no new 
facts were named by Hull to justify his sudden change of 
mind concerning the PRC’s program.  He also made clear 
that he “cannot, of course, agree that it be abandoned – 
which is what your [Hull’s] letter really suggests – unless I 
receive a direction to that effect from the President”. Hull, 
working toward this to happen, followed up on January 8th 
with a letter to the President stating that “I believe that 
negotiations of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation looking 
to governmental participation in companies having foreign 
reserves should be held in abeyance”134. The infighting 
found no end. Roosevelt half-heartedly addressed the 
problem by writing on January 10th 135: 
It is, of course, true that the State Department should 
handle, in general, matters relating to foreign affairs – but 
at the present time I think it is vital that we should go 
ahead with some speed in negotiating with the American 
companies, in order to find out just where the United 
States stands before we take the matter up with the 
British. 
 He asked helplessly: “Can’t we agree on a policy 
and on the method of putting it into effect?” It was British 
style against agreement with the British, Hull and part of the 
industry against Ickes and the PRC. At this point the conflict 
became so highly complex and took place at so many 
alternative levels of organization with competing truths and 
interpretations, that an attempt to base its account on 
primary sources would go beyond any reasonable scope of 
the format of our work. A comprehensive narrative of the 
infighting over which oil policy the United States should 
pursue would fill a book even if only late 1943 and 1944 
were examined. The project of purchasing a controlling 
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interest in an American oil company operating abroad 
ultimately failed due to strong resistance from domestic 
competitors, especially the Texas independents136, and due 
to resistance from the Department of State. Ickes first rolled 
back to joining Hull in attempting to become the directing 
head behind the negotiations with the British, proposing i. a. 
to Roosevelt his blueprints for an agreement with the British 
that would, as he believed, also “have industry support”137. 
He subsequently came to champion the plan of getting the 
US government into a $120,000,000 pipeline deal with 
Socal, Texas, and Gulf Oil to better supply the European war 
theater with Middle Eastern oil. A side-effect of this would 
certainly have been that any comprehensive negotiations 
with the British about the Middle East would only have been 
feasible with the President of the PRC, who would have 
controlled that pipeline. Ickes would have gained a new, long 
lever to make himself indispensable for any designs by Hull. 
It would have become impossible for Hull to exclude Ickes or 
even just relegate him to the second row in the negotiations 
with the British. But once D-Day worked out to be a success 
Ickes lost the important military backing of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff for the pipeline-project, which was now no longer 
militarily essential. The pipeline project ultimately fainted as 
the central cause of the PRC and the PRC itself in a 
comparably nasty political battle.  
 In both cases, this multidimensional battle took 
place to a great extent in a secretive and intriguing manner, 
off the official records. A look into the bibliographies of the 
well-researched secondary literature on the subject reveals 
that much of the knowledge or what is sold to be knowledge 
relies on later interviews and diaries more than on 
governmental or other official, contemporary records. The 
going got tough before the idea of adapting the old imperial, 
equity-based British style dwindled away in favor of seeking 
an agreement with the British. Ickes repeatedly threatened 
to resign and James Moffet threatened the government to 
sue Ickes, Davies, and Marshall over this “Arabian thing” 
which he called “screwball as Hell”138. He also asked 
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Roosevelt to demand Ickes’ resignation139. Roosevelt 
backed Ickes, in turn even threatening his old companion 
between the lines “I think you would make a great mistake 
were you to bring suits and make allegations against 
anyone”140. 
 With rising geopolitical relevance, the entire oil 
matter, also internationally, became increasingly 
characterized by tremendous hick-hack, even at the highest 
level – between Roosevelt and Churchill. Roosevelt 
proposed to a suspicious Lord Halifax by drawing a map to 
essentially share the oil of Iraq and Kuwait, while the Persian 
oil would remain purely British and the Saudi oil purely 
American. Nonetheless Halifax wired to London that the 
Americans were “treating us [the British] shockingly”141 
which was due to prior talks with lower-ranking American 
functionaries. Upon that message Churchill wrote to 
Roosevelt that there is “apprehension in some quarters here 
that the United States has a desire to deprive us of our oil 
assets in the Middle East” and that some felt that we [the 
British] “are being hustled”142. Roosevelt replied that he had 
been reported that the British were “eyeing” American 
concessions and trying to “horn in” on them”143. But since 
the subject of the bitter discussions that took place in 
springtime Washington with the British was “not a rationing 
of scarcity […], but the orderly development and orderly 
distribution of abundance”, as Petroleum Adviser Charles 
Rayner put it144, an agreement was possible and was 
ultimately reached on August 8th. Lord Beaverbrook 
criticized it as a “monster cartel”145, but it was agreed upon. 
It would safeguard mutual respect for the contracted status 
quo146 and it would install an International Petroleum 
Commission with eight members, endowed to establish 
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production quotas147. The independent oil companies again 
feared for the basis of their existence, for such quotas to 
them sounded like an opening of floodgates: Were not such 
structures harbingers of potential future regulation of 
domestic production, which they relied upon? The majors 
involved in the agreement could use their international 
leverage and cheap Middle Eastern oil to push the 
independents out of markets. But the majors were also 
fearful concerning any such agreement, because 
compliance with the International Petroleum Commission’s 
policies could force them into conflict with the Sherman 
Antitrust Acts. Thus the majors had insisted on liberation of 
any such contingency via explicit treaty-insurance148. Had 
no such phrase been included, not even the majors would 
have been willing to support the agreement and blocked it 
via their middlemen in the senate, fearing to become 
vulnerable to lawsuits. However, had the said phrase been 
too much of a blank check, yet other forces in the senate 
would have blocked its ratification in cooperation with the 
middlemen of the independents. The ever-loud Harold Ickes, 
especially with his interventionist ambitions of the prior 
winter, did not do the atmosphere in the oil industry any 
good. Ultimately the industry at large came to oppose the 
agreement. It was submitted to the senate but fearing a 
spectacular defeat, Roosevelt withdrew it in January 
1945149. The Big Three were to meet at Yalta to discuss the 
matter anew in the context of grander geopolitics. 
 In the midst of all this, direct relations with Saudi 
Arabia of course also continued. In accordance with an 
agreement with the British of December 2nd, 1943, the 
United States supplied Ibn Saud in 1944 with “certain 
reconnaissance cars, machine guns, 10,000 rifles, and 
miscellaneous equipment”150. Another issue was and of 
course continued to be Palestine, reinvigorated by the 
Palestine Resolutions in reaction to which Ibn Saud 
addressed protest to President Roosevelt151, who attempted 
to reconcile the King on April 13th by reconfirming his 
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stipulation that “no decision altering the basic situation of 
Palestine should be reached without full consultation with 
both Arabs and Jews”152. 
 Doubtlessly a memorandum to the President from 
Hull’s Department of State153 suggesting an extension of 
financial and economic assistance to Saudi Arabia must be 
seen in tight relation to the talks with the British and also in 
relation with the ever-delicate issue of Jewish immigration to 
Palestine. The memorandum warned about increasing 
British payments to Ibn Saud and that the King had even 
already agreed to remove certain America-friendly high-
ranking officials and to appoint a British Economic Adviser 
and potentially a British Petroleum Adviser. It is equally 
beyond doubt that the shrewd monarch was well aware of 
the tactical opportunities that such intensified competition 
over his favor opened up for him. It is not overly fantastic to 
speculate that enticing the United States into increased 
assistance to him was at least a component of his motivation 
to ostentatiously display accommodation of British demands. 
Such machination would not have been a premiere, and 
playing the two competing giants out against each other 
virtually imposed itself in Ibn Saud’s situation.  
At this point in time the tendency of development of 
American policy towards Saudi Arabia shifted again, but in a 
different direction. From a modern perspective, one might 
say that after excessive activism had followed the lethargy of 
the 1930s (with its central ambitions having failed) US policy 
towards Saudi Arabia normalized. Against this backdrop we 
find it appropriate to finish our account of the awakening of 
American foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia before the end 
of the war. The essay at hand essentially focused on a wave 
which build up, gained momentum, and subsided. This wave 
appeared at the horizon in 1939, it mounted up highest in 
late 1943 – and it broke in 1944.  
VI. Conclusion 
A careful reading of what is represented in this text and – in 
the case of our research focus especially so – what is not 
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represented and contained in it makes clear, that the long 
inactivity of the American state towards Saudi Arabia was 
not an elaborate and deliberate machination to co-opt a 
weary desert monarch who was known to be suspicious 
towards the West. Much rather, it was the result of a long-
lasting neglect of the matter. In none of the primary sources 
that this work is based on was there any evidence of a 
conscious and purposeful holding-back of political ambitions 
so as to leave the field to private American actors as long as 
possible. Much rather, the documents convey a feeling that 
the higher the American political strata was, the higher was 
also the politicians’ reluctance to become active as a 
government (i.e. save the ever-restless Harold Ickes) and to 
be the one to initiate such action and bear responsibility for 
it. This went on even when the companies themselves asked 
for a more active state. 
 After all, neither the Americans nor the Saudi 
monarch had much of a choice at the time. One party 
needed support desperately to stabilize his regime, and the 
other needed oil desperately to sustainably fuel a growing 
thirst for oil. The oil companies are by nature self-interested 
and profit-oriented actors who saw a tremendous opportunity 
paired with tremendous risks. They behaved accordingly. As 
of the British, they of course did not behave in a very 
unexpected way either by trying to cling to whatever oil they 
could; the UK does not dispose of substantial domestic 
crude oil reserves, and the sustained danger from Germany 
did not allow the British to be very choosy in their methods to 
ensure strategic parity with their competitors. 
 As mentioned several times, the highest-level 
thought giving structure to this essay was the co-evolution of 
two American developments which were equally necessary 
to bring about the shift in American policy towards Saudi 
Arabia. The first of these developments was a growing fear 
of the depletion of domestic crude oil reserves and of their 
future inadequacy, and the second was the growing 
awareness that Saudi Arabian drillings had not discovered 
just another oil field in just another undeveloped country, but  
a gigantic treasure. The effect of the interaction of these two 
developments was the triggering of a tortu(r)ous policy-
finding process in Washington. The essay has furthermore 
shown how this interaction was facilitated and potentially 
even afforded by the circumstances of world war, whose  
necessities were politically instrumentalized by virtually all 
participants in the gamble for power, money, prestige –  and 
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